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Tabor Lecture 
NUMERICAL HALF TRUTHS, HUMAN LIES, 
AND OTHER DISTORTIONS OF TRUTH 
Richard W. Painter∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Glenn J. Tabor Lecture has been an opportunity for me to 
explore with the faculty, staff, and students of Valparaiso Law School an 
issue at the juncture of professional responsibility and business ethics:  
whether our society’s obsession with rankings and other numerical 
measures of success has undermined our honesty and commitment to 
the values that matter most.  I believe it has, and in this Paper I briefly 
explain some of the reasons why. 
Before I met Glenn Tabor at this lecture, I knew that his professional 
life was an extraordinary success.1  One could attempt to quantify Glenn 
Tabor’s professional accomplishments, perhaps by tallying his win-loss 
record at trial, or measuring the mean amount of his jury awards (or 
should it be the median?).  Perhaps the number of lawyers in his law 
firm is relevant, or the average profits per partner (if we are interested in 
“equity” among partners, perhaps the median is more important).  
Perhaps we should consider the amount of money Mr. Tabor himself has 
made practicing law. 
Or perhaps not. 
When I met Mr. Tabor, I learned that he was not only a great lawyer 
but a sincere and passionate human being.  Although this lecture is 
named for him, achieving recognition is not his objective; neither is the 
acquisition of money or material goods.  I have learned about his 
commitment to social justice, his concern for his community, and his 
desire to make the world a better place.  Mr. Tabor’s career confirms that 
the most important things in life—including that part of us commonly 
referred to as “character”2—cannot be quantified. 
                                                 
∗  University of Minnesota Law School, S. Walter Richey Professor of Corporate Law. 
1 The Indiana General Assembly passed a resolution congratulating Mr. Tabor for his 
selection as the recipient of the 1999 Indiana Trial Lawyers Lifetime Achievement Award.  
See S.J. Res. 0044, 110th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 1999), 
http://www.in.gov/legislative/bills/1999/PDF/SRESF/SC0044.pdf. 
2 Cognitive psychology sometimes attempts to quantify and explain attributes, such as 
trust, empathy, and honesty, and I have found some of these studies useful in my own 
analysis of business lawyers.  See Richard W. Painter, Lawyers’ Rules, Auditors’ Rules and the 
Psychology of Concealment, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1399, 1413–14 (2000) (discussing Daniel 
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In this Article, I discuss a few examples of how obsession with 
quantitative measures of success undermines ethics in education, law, 
and business.  There are other areas of civic life, such as government, 
where quantitative measures of success have also had their toll.  For 
example, politics is shaped by our obsession with quantitative ratings by 
liberal and conservative interest groups, campaign dollars raised and 
spent, numbers of electoral votes, and numbers of members needed for 
control of a legislative body.  These concerns, however, are topics for 
discussion at another time. 
II.  QUANTITATIVE MEASURES OF ACCOMPLISHMENT IN EDUCATION, LAW, 
AND BUSINESS 
Education was transformed by standardized testing in the mid-
twentieth century.  Scholastic Aptitude Tests (“SAT”) were introduced 
into college admissions in the 1930s.3  At the time, President Conant of 
Harvard used the SAT’s presumably objective measure of academic 
ability to increase the fairness of an admissions process, which had 
previously drawn students principally from well-known boarding 
schools and other private academies.4  The SAT soon spread to other 
colleges after the beginning of World War II, and admissions for many 
top colleges became increasingly selective.  By the 1960s, R. Inslee 
                                                                                                             
Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory:  An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 
ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979)).   These basic human traits, along with others, such as love and 
regret, however, are impossible to describe exclusively or even principally with 
quantitative measures. 
3 See Geoffrey Kabaservice, The Birth of a New Institution:  How Two Yale Presidents and 
Their Admissions Directors Tore up the “Old Blueprint” to Create a Modern Yale, YALE ALUMNI 
MAG. (Dec. 1999), available at http://www.yalealumnimagazine.com/issues/99_12/ 
admissions.html (noting that in the 1930s Harvard President James Conant envisioned a 
reconstruction of the education system). 
4 Princeton psychology professor Carl Brigham had helped the Army set up its IQ 
testing program during World War I and adjusted the methodology of that test to create 
the SAT.  Americans Instrumental in Establishing Standardized Tests, PBS:  FRONTLINE (Oct. 
1999), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/sats/where/three. 
html.  Conant and his admissions directors then used it beginning in the early 1940s.  Id.  
See generally James Bryant Conant, Education for a Classless Society, 165 THE ATLANTIC 
MONTHLY 593, 602 (May 1940), available at http://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/issues/ 
95sep/ets/edcla.htm (“Extreme differentiation of school programs seems essential—
differentiation of instruction, but not necessarily a division into separate schools.  From this 
it follows that rapid improvement in our testing methods must be forthcoming; a much 
more conscientious and discriminating form of educational guidance must be developed 
soon if we are not to fail.”). 
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(“Inky”) Clark, as Yale’s Admissions Director, was transforming Yale’s 
process to match much of what had already been done at Harvard.5 
Overall, this resulted in many colleges having a student body that 
was more diverse and more academically focused than ever before.  
Wrinkles in the system—such as the fact that standardized tests may 
discriminate against some minority groups through built-in cultural 
assumptions in test questions6—were ignored or believed to be 
counteracted by robust affirmative action programs (these programs 
provided another set of numerical targets for admissions officers to 
meet).  There were many motivating factors behind these changes in Ivy 
League colleges and elsewhere, but administrators relied upon the SAT 
and other standardized tests to make these changes happen.7 
Elementary and secondary schools later followed suit by also relying 
on standardized tests, first to prepare students for the SAT and 
American College Testing Exam (“ACT”)—for example, the Secondary 
School Admission Test (“SSAT”) is given for admission to private 
secondary schools, and the Preliminary SAT (“PSAT”) is given in the 
junior year as a “trial run” before the SAT; these two tests have been 
used for decades.  Then, with increased public concern about the quality 
of public primary and secondary education, states developed their own 
proficiency exams.   Finally, in 2002, the No Child Left Behind Act 
federally mandated testing and tied both school funding and teacher and 
administrator careers to test results.8  If the current year’s numbers 
looked good—or at least comparatively good relative to other years—
                                                 
5 Kabaservice, supra note 3 (“The Class of 1970 entered with the highest SAT scores in 
Yale’s history . . . .”). 
6 See Roy O. Freedle, Correcting the SAT’s Ethnic and Social-Class Bias:  A Method for 
Reestimating SAT Scores, 73 HARV. EDU. REV. 1, 1 (2003) (“The SAT has been shown to be 
both culturally and statistically biased against African Americans, Hispanic Americans, 
and Asian Americans.”).  Freedle’s study was replicated later by researchers who found 
similar results.  See Maria Veronica Santelices & Mark Wilson, Unfair Treatment?  The Case of 
Freedle, the SAT, and the Standardization Approach to Differential Item Functioning, 80 HARV. 
EDU. REV. 106, 126 (2010) (“[T]he SAT, a high-stakes test with significant consequences for 
the educational opportunities available to young people in the United States, favors one 
ethnic group over another.”). 
7 Reliance on testing to assess potential for future success extends in some areas of the 
country to as early as age three or four when private schools give intelligence tests for 
admission to pre-K and kindergarten programs where, in some cases, the programs run 
through 12th grade.  See Jennifer Senior, The Junior Meritocracy, N.Y. MAG. (Jan. 31, 2010), 
available at http://nymag.com/news/features/63427/ (explaining that most private and 
public schools in New York require standardized exams for kindergarten admission).  
News coverage of this admissions process almost invariably mentions the fact that many 
parents assume that their child’s entry into these schools will assure a smooth path to 
admission to high-ranking colleges and universities.  Id. 
8 No Child Left Behind Act, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425, 1439–40 (2002). 
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schools would likely get more money, administrators could justify high 
salaries, and teachers would keep their jobs.  If not, everyone would be 
in trouble.  Law school admissions have moved in the same direction.  
The quantitative measure of academic merit has been the Law School 
Admission Test (“LSAT”), which is heavily weighted in law school 
admissions along with an applicant’s grade point average (“GPA”). 
Then, beginning in the 1980s, another quantitative measure moved 
to the fore—the colleges and universities that rank students along a 
quantitative scale for admissions would also be evaluated themselves in 
like manner.9  Media companies made money advising prospective 
students as to where to apply and admitted students as to which 
institution they should attend based on a ranking system.  The criteria 
used by U.S. News and other media outlets for ranking educational 
institutions were narrow and educators complained loudly.10  But it 
would be hard to claim that the ranking criteria were any narrower than 
the factors the educators themselves used in admissions, principally the 
SAT, other standardized tests, and GPAs.  If educational institutions 
could rank applicants and proclaim that their rankings were accurate, or 
relatively accurate, compared with what had been done before, then the 
applicants had reason to believe that media outlets could also provide 
accurate numerical rankings of the institutions. 
Rankings based on quantitative measures of achievement inform 
and sometimes dictate decisions, and sometimes the results appear to be 
absurd.  For example, I recently asked a law dean which of two 
hypothetical students he would admit to a top 20 law school.  Student A 
has a 3.3 GPA from the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign in 
engineering (Illinois has one of the top engineering programs in the 
world).  Student B has a 3.9 GPA from Northern Illinois University with 
a major in leisure studies or perhaps physical education.  The two 
students have the same LSAT score.  The law dean told me that he might 
feel compelled to choose student B over student A.  The reason:  U.S. 
News looks almost exclusively at GPA and LSAT scores in assessing the 
quality of a law school’s student body,11 and choosing student A could 
lower the overall GPA for the law school, leading to a decline in ranking, 
                                                 
9 See, e.g., Robert Morse & Sam Flanigan, Methodology:  Law School Rankings, U.S. NEWS 
AND WORLD REP. (Mar. 12, 2012), http://www.usnews.com/education/best-graduate-
schools/top-law-schools/articles/2012/03/12/methodology-law-school-rankings 
(providing the different criteria used by U.S. News to rank law schools, including median 
LSAT scores, median undergrad GPA, employment rates for graduates, and assessment 
scores of lawyers and judges). 
10 See id. (noting the factors analyzed by U.S. News and World Report to determine a 
law school’s ranking). 
11 Id. 
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so that the next year neither student A nor student B would want to 
enroll in the law school.  Although many graduate programs, including 
medical schools, interview applicants, law schools almost never do; thus, 
the law dean or his colleagues would probably never meet either student 
until he or she enrolled.12 
Reliance on quantitative measures of achievement has extended to 
law practice as well.  Narrow hiring criteria have been entrenched for a 
long time, with some law firms only hiring from the top of the class at a 
handful of law schools and the very top of the class at a few other law 
schools.  As law firms became larger and hired more associates, 
however, reliance on rankings became more complex.13  While there was 
a somewhat broader range of law schools under consideration, class rank 
within law school became extremely important, particularly for students 
at more modestly ranked law schools.  With more associates being hired, 
there would be less time, particularly lawyer time, spent interviewing 
and checking references on each applicant.14  Law firm partners would 
be very unlikely to know most of the applicants in other contexts, 
because the days had long since past when lawyers practiced in their 
hometowns and law firms hired most of their associates locally. 
Law firms rely heavily on quantitative measures of an applicant’s 
potential for future success; for most applicants, this boils down to the 
ranking of the law school they attend, which is determined in large part 
by one’s LSAT score and law school GPA.  In robust economic times, law 
firms have relied on summer associate programs for recruiting 
associates; meaning that first year law school grades count the most, 
while third year grades hardly count at all.15 
I will not here enter the debate over whether the particular law 
school a student attends and law school GPA accurately predict future 
success in the practice of law.  I also will not address “efficiency” based 
arguments that if there were better criteria for hiring associates, then 
profit-maximizing law firms would use them.  Perhaps it does not matter 
much anyway, because at large law firms very few of the associates hired 
                                                 
12 This may be changing as a few of the most highly ranked law schools recognize the 
importance of qualitative as well as quantitative criteria in the admissions process; for 
example, Harvard Law School offers interviews to a number of applicants and in 2012 
announced that it would expand that number, lengthen the interview to fifteen minutes, 
and use video conferencing over Skype instead of just the telephone.  See Juliet R. Bailin, 
Harvard Law School to Conduct Interviews over Skype, THE HARV. CRIMSON, Oct. 16, 2012, 
http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2012/10/16/Harvard-Law-School-Skype/. 
13 See generally MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS (1991) 
(discussing the transformation of the big law firm). 
14 Id. 
15 It is not certain, in view of present economic difficulties and contraction of some large 
law firms, that this practice will resume even when the economy recovers. 
Painter: Numerical Half Truths, Human Lies, and Other Distortions of Truth
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2013
484 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47 
make partner or even remain more than a few years.  The law firm has 
ample opportunity to apply its own measures of assessment once 
associates arrive, and the low retention rate is perhaps an indicator that 
the two dimensional hiring criteria of law school rank and class rank are 
not accurate predictors of which associates will be the best fit for the 
firm’s practice.  The law firm only uses these criteria to determine who 
can enter its “tournament of lawyers” and does its real assessment of the 
contestants later.16 
Quantitative measures of achievement, however, continue to be 
important in the firm after a lawyer is hired.  In many firms, billable 
hours are a critical measure used for associate compensation and 
decisions about promotion to partner.  Clients may complain that this 
system emphasizes quantity rather than quality of legal work and that it 
may even encourage overbilling, but most law firms address this 
problem by writing off time on client bills and making other 
adjustments. 
For partners in law firms, there is yet another critically important 
ranking:  profits per partner for the firm.  The American Lawyer and 
other publications rank law firms according to many criteria, including 
some attempts to poll clients and other lawyers on the quality of their 
work, but in the sea of law firm rankings, profits per partner is the 
primary evaluative criteria.  Partners watch this ranking and so does the 
media—a drop in profits per partner is assumed to spell trouble for a 
firm, encouraging its more productive partners to consider jumping ship. 
And here again is an illustration of how rankings at various 
junctures in the system reinforce each other.  Law students considering 
associate positions are aware of profit per partner numbers, and law 
students lucky enough to have multiple employment offers consider 
these rankings.  Many of the most successful law students have lived and 
thrived in a quantitative ranking system for all of their lives.  Against a 
background of substantial uncertainty about their future in the practice 
of law, they feel comfortable relying on law firm rankings as they had 
used law school rankings three years earlier.17  The fact that the law firm 
                                                 
16 See GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 13, at 100 (referencing “promotion-to-partner 
tournament” as the practice in which associates at large firms fight for a position as 
partner). 
17 I recall that during my second year of law school in 1986, law students, with 
encouragement from some partners in the same firms, discussed Cravath, Swaine & Moore, 
Davis Polk & Wardwell, and Sullivan & Cromwell as the “Harvard,” “Princeton,” and 
“Yale” of law firms, respectively.  In those days Wachtel, Lipton, Rosen & Katz had only 
recently shot up the rankings toward the very top in profits per partner, a reality that may 
have been disconcerting for lawyers and law students used to thinking of law firms, and 
perhaps other things as well, in terms of there being a “top three.”  And, of course, other 
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is for most associates likely to be yet another line on a resume—and 
perhaps another educational experience—makes it more likely that law 
students will heavily weigh a firm’s ranking when making their 
employment decisions. 
Other quantitative measures of success are important to the largest 
law firm clients, most of which are publicly-held companies.  For them, 
the holy-grail is stock price, which is closely followed by annual and 
quarterly earnings.  Senior officers’ compensation is routinely tied to the 
present year’s stock price and earnings.  Using stock options as 
compensation, instead of the stock itself, puts even more emphasis on 
short-term fluctuations in stock price.  Robust earnings projections can 
help boost stock price, unless of course the company does not meet them. 
Federal law has reinforced the use of quantitative measures of 
corporate achievement, since the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 required audited financial statements for public 
companies and assured investors of financial statement accuracy by 
making both companies and their auditors liable if audited financial 
statements were incorrect.18  These laws require many other disclosures 
that are not quantitative, such as discussion in registration statements of 
business operations and officers’ background and experience, but the 
laws are designed to assure that the numbers a company reports are 
accurate.19 
Academic economists often assume that these numbers public 
companies report are correct, or at least that securities markets are good 
at using these numbers and other factors to assess the overall value of a 
company.  By the mid-twentieth century, the “efficient capital market 
hypothesis” replaced the skepticism about stock prices that had 
dominated the thinking of John Maynard Keynes and other earlier 
                                                                                                             
New York law firms have been financially successful, in some years more successful than 
the aforementioned firms.  The American Lawyer’s profits per partner rankings substituted 
more objective criteria—albeit one-dimensional criteria—for the old prejudices that some 
firms were more prestigious because they always had been more prestigious.  In some 
respects, the function of these rankings is similar to that of using SAT scores in college 
admissions—as an objective measure of preparedness, instead of recruiting students 
mostly from well-known preparatory schools.  And perhaps these rankings also have 
analogous drawbacks. 
18 See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2006) (imposing liability on auditors 
as well as issuers for misleading financial statements and other material misrepresentations 
in a financial statement); Security Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2006) (requiring 
an audit of financial statements and setting out the guidelines of such audits). 
19 See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(5) (requiring a background check on 
each officer holding a certain amount of outstanding equity). 
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economists.20  The law and economics movement has reinforced among 
some lawyers and judges this same view that the numbers—particularly 
market prices—tell an accurate story.  Investors, the media, and other 
observers in turn assume that corporate executives—like college 
applicants, law students, and lawyers—should be evaluated according to 
these numbers. 
Finally, a round of hostile tender offers in the 1980s, reinforced by 
academic acceptance of a “market for corporate control,”21 shook up 
entrenched elites in corporate boardrooms in much the same way that 
Conant’s use of the SAT shook up entrenched elites in top universities.  
Directors and officers, like college applicants and football coaches, 
would be judged by the numbers—specifically, earnings and stock price.  
Meritocracy in corporate governance meant immediate realization of 
shareholder value according to the numerical metrics widely accepted as 
a measure of that value.  If managers’ numbers were not as good as they 
could be, privileged positions in the corporate boardroom and executive 
suite would be lost when dissatisfied shareholders tendered their shares 
to a hostile bidder. 
III.  THE ETHICAL CONSEQUENCES OF NUMERICAL ASSESSMENT OF 
PERFORMANCE 
There are many consequences of modern society’s reliance on 
numerical measures of achievement.  For example, schools teaching for 
state proficiency exams or the SAT/ACT will probably spend less time 
teaching material that is not on the test, even if that material is important 
for other educational objectives.  Universities that emphasize football 
                                                 
20 Compare 1 CHARLES MACKAY, MEMOIRS OF EXTRAORDINARY POPULAR DELUSIONS AND 
THE MADNESS OF CROWDS 1–97 (London, L.C. Page & Co. 1932) (1841) (describing 
historically irrational economic bubbles and providing a humorous commentary on them), 
and JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT INTEREST AND MONEY 
156 (London, MacMillan & Co. 1960) (1936) (likening equity markets to a beauty contest 
because investors are concerned principally with what other investors think), with William 
T. Allen, Securities Markets as Social Products:  The Pretty Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, 
28 J. CORP. L. 551, 562–63 (2003) (supporting the use of the efficient capital market 
hypothesis). 
21 See generally Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s 
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1196 (1981) (arguing that 
market for corporate control provides an incentive to management to efficiently operate); 
Gregg A. Jarrell, James A. Brickley & Jeffry M. Netter, The Market for Corporate Control:  The 
Empirical Evidence Since 1980, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1988, at 49, 51 (noting that market for 
corporate control serves a beneficial function for the economy); Michael C. Jensen & 
Richard S. Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control:  The Scientific Evidence, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 
5, 47 (1983) (arguing that corporate takeovers generate positive gain for the shareholder’s 
benefit). 
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scores may give insufficient attention to their academic mission and to 
admitting students qualified to fulfill that mission.  Companies that 
emphasize only annual and quarterly performance may give insufficient 
attention to research and development, client and employee relations, 
environmental sustainability, and other aspects of their businesses that 
are not reflected in current profits or stock price.  Hostile takeovers and 
the so-called “market for corporate control” may make this problem 
worse.  Admittedly, many of these claims are controversial—for 
example, one can argue that a well-rounded education combined with 
innate intelligence improves SAT scores, or that U.S. News rankings 
reflect the quality of a law school, or that market prices anticipate and 
reward well-managed companies, even if their current earnings are not 
impressive. 
The focus of this Paper, however, is on the ethical consequences of 
our obsession with the numbers.  And those consequences, I believe, are 
worrisome.22 
A. Cheating 
For ages, some students have cheated on tests.  The SAT and ACT 
are no exception.  In 2012, a large cheating scandal was uncovered in 
Long Island.23  Similar cheating has likely taken place elsewhere.  State 
proficiency exams are also vulnerable to cheating, with the added 
complication that school administers, who are supposed to prevent 
cheating and are required to report it when it does occur, are themselves 
interested in the test scores.  In education, as in corporate governance, 
monitors probably should not have interests too closely aligned with the 
persons they are supposed to monitor.  In 2012, Stuyvesant High School, 
one of the top public schools in the country, had to void seventy student 
test scores on the New York State Regents Exam because students 
cheated using cell phones and texting devices.24  Stuyvesant’s own 
student newspaper had two years earlier reported a culture of academic 
dishonesty, “whose roots derived from an emphasis on numerical 
                                                 
22 See infra Part III.A (exploring the rise of cheating in educational and business 
institutions). 
23 See Jenny Anderson, SAT and ACT to Tighten Rules After Cheating Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 27, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/28/education/after-cheating-scandal-
sat-and-act-will-tighten-security.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (reporting on the reaction to a 
large cheating scandal in Long Island in which the Nassau County district attorney’s office 
charged twenty teenagers for participating in a scheme where high scoring students used 
fake IDs and were paid $500 to $3600 to take the SAT for other students). 
24 Al Baker, At Top School, Cheating Voids 70 Pupils’ Tests, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/10/nyregion/70-students-at-stuyvesant-to-retake-
exams-after-cheating-case.html?pagewanted=all. 
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success, like high test scores, rather than on valuing learning that is not 
as easy to measure.”25 
Cheating in college is apparently widespread.26  Law Schools are 
prone to cheating as well, with tolerance by some faculty members who 
do not want to incur the burdens associated with accusing a student of 
cheating.27 
Corporate executives also sometimes cheat in their businesses in 
order to increase earnings, whether by making unsafe products, 
violating environmental laws, or, according to allegations made in 2012 
against Wal-Mart, violating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.28 
Another form of cheating is dishonest reporting of numerical results.  
Some school districts inaccurately report test scores in order to comply 
with numerical goals set under the No Child Left Behind Act.  Some law 
schools report inaccurate information to the ABA.  Those that have been 
caught include:  Villanova, which reported inflated LSAT and GPA data 
to the ABA apparently in order to enhance its U.S. News ranking; and 
the University of Illinois College of Law, which was fined $250,000 by 
the ABA in 2012 for doing the same thing.29  In the case of Illinois, the 
admissions director, whose job it was to report the data, was also 
compensated based on his success in recruiting students with high LSAT 
and GPA—an obvious conflict of interest that a subsequent investigation 
by an outside law firm pointed out needed to be corrected.30 
Cheating in reporting results is a sin the corporate world knows all 
too well.  Enron and WorldCom were the most prominent recent 
                                                 
25 Id. 
26 See Donald L. McCabe, It Takes a Village:  Academic Dishonesty and Educational 
Opportunity, LIBERAL EDUC., Summer/Fall 2005, at 26, 28 (reporting that up to fifty percent 
of undergraduates admit to having cheated on tests or other forms of academic 
dishonesty). 
27 See generally Sue D. Naim, Student Cheats and Those Who Harbor Them, 60 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 664 (2011) (discussing the hesitation to turn in law students who cheat). 
28 See David Barstow, Vast Mexico Bribery Case Hushed up by Wal-Mart After Top-Level 
Struggle, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/22/business/at-
wal-mart-in-mexico-a-bribe-inquiry-silenced.html?pagewanted=all (reporting on how 
illegal payments to government officials fueled Wal-Mart’s growth in Mexico). 
29 Villanova Censured for Inflating GPAs, LSAT Scores, FOXNEWS.COM (Aug. 16, 2011), 
available at http://www.foxnews.com/us/2011/08/16/villanova-censured-for-inflating-
gpas-lsat-scores/. 
30 See University of Illinois College of Law: Censure, COUNCIL OF THE SECTION OF LEGAL 
EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, at 1–2 (June 
2012), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_ 
and_admissions_to_the_bar/council_reports_and_resolutions/2012_june_u_illinois_public
_censure.authcheckdam.pdf (imposing $250,000 in monetary sanctions and other penalties 
for intentionally reporting inaccurate data on LSAT scores and GPAs of entering classes in 
2005 and 2007–2011). 
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examples of executives manipulating numerical data to lie about their 
companies.  These incidents led to the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act in 2002, which, among other things, tightened accounting controls 
and the auditing process.31  As some of the events leading up to the 
financial collapse of 2008 illustrated, however, this legislation did not 
entirely solve the problem. 
In Repo 105, Lehman Brothers concealed 50 billion dollars in debt on 
its quarterly balance sheets up through 2008 by selling low-quality 
assets, mostly mortgage-backed derivatives, to other banks for cash and 
using the cash to pay down debt at the end of each quarter.32  These 
“sales” and the “repayments” would be unwound, and the junk assets 
and debt would be added back to the balance sheet a few days later.33  
English law apparently allowed the transaction to be treated as a “sale” 
if the assets were valued at 105% or more of the cash paid for them.34  It 
did not matter that substantially equivalent assets would be given back 
to Lehman and the cash returned a few days later.35  Linklaters, a law 
firm in London, opined that the sale, coupled with a repurchase 
agreement, was a true sale under English law, a conclusion that might or 
might not have been technically correct.36  Lehman transferred the 
securities to London, where the transaction was executed through its 
London branch.37  It was reported to Lehman’s auditors in the United 
States as a true sale and recorded as such on Lehman’s consolidated 
balance sheet for its quarterly report.38  After the transaction was 
unwound, it could be repeated at the end of the next quarter and the 
next quarter and so on. 
Repo 105 may have complied with U.K. law governing sales, but the 
failure to disclose such a large amount of assets and liabilities failed to 
                                                 
31 See Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 7202 et seq. (2006) (controlling accounting 
and auditing procedures). 
32 See Report of Anton R. Valukas, Examiner at 1–14, In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., 
No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.  Mar. 11, 2010) (explaining the circumstances 
surrounding Lehman’s eventual bankruptcy). 
33 See id. at 782–93 (discussing Lehman’s use of a Repo 105 transaction to adjust its 
balance sheet). 
34 Id. at 783–86. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at app. 17, at 31 (Linklaters Letter to Lehman Brothers International (Europe) on 
May 31, 2006) (“Subject to the qualifications set out in this opinion, in respect of each 
Transaction, following the transfer by Seller to Buyer of the Purchased Securities, in our 
opinion, Seller will have disposed of its entire proprietary interest in the Purchased 
Securities by way of sale.”). 
37 Id. at 784–93 (discussing the Repo 105 transaction facilitated through Linklaters law 
firm in London). 
38 See id. at 1–14 (explaining the circumstances surrounding Lehman’s eventual 
bankruptcy). 
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comply with basic disclosure requirements for a public company in the 
United States.  If Lehman Brothers had been a private company, as it was 
up through the 1980s, this transaction would have been pointless, 
because the partners would have been lying to themselves about the 
value of their business.  The numbers reported to Lehman’s public 
investors lied about the firm’s debt levels and the quality of its assets.  
The people who ran Lehman—and arguably their lawyers and 
accountants—lied as well.  When Lehman Brothers finally acknowledged 
its insolvency and filed for bankruptcy in September 2008, it brought 
much of the financial system down with it.   
B. Crowding Out 
Yet another problem with the ascendancy of numerical measures of 
success is that criteria that cannot be measured numerically are crowded 
out.  Standardized testing, for example, may crowd out other 
educational priorities, including classroom discussion of ethics and civic 
responsibility.  Using test scores for college or law school admission 
crowds out other factors, such as the character of the applicant.  
Quantitative criteria for measuring performance on the job (for example, 
billable hours of law firm associates) may crowd out other criteria, such 
as the ethical practice of one’s profession or trade.  Finally, 
management’s emphasis on reported earnings and stock price crowds 
out attention to business ethics, as well as other priorities. 
One indicator of sound ethics is a business person’s relationship with 
longstanding customers.  Such relationships, however, are difficult to 
measure quantitatively.  Accounting methods used to calculate corporate 
earnings do not, and probably cannot, include changes in the value of a 
company’s reputation.  If senior managers’ bonuses, and even continued 
employment, are based principally on the current year’s bottom line, and 
the bottom line does not reflect reputation, reputation will be less 
important to these managers.  Directors and officers of public companies 
who are driven by the numbers (principally stock price and earnings) 
have little incentive to assign a high value to a factor that cannot be 
easily quantified. 
Henry Kaufman, formerly the head economist for Salomon Brothers, 
recalls how taking advantage of clients was viewed when the firm was a 
partnership instead of a public company and when the firm’s annual 
profits were a closely-held secret: 
During one of our executive committee meetings back in 
the 1970s, a young trader interrupted the meeting that 
was then being held by Bill Salomon, the managing 
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partner, and he gave him a slip informing him of a very 
large bond trade we had just completed with one of our 
institutional clients. 
 
Bill asked, “How much did we take out of the trade?” 
 
The young trader replied, “A point,” meaning one 
percentage point. 
 
Bill then called in the partner in charge of transactions, 
who reaffirmed that the firm had made one point. 
 
Bill Salomon’s admonition was brief and to the point.  
He said, “Salomon Brothers does not take such a profit.”  
The bonds purchased were highly marketable, of high 
quality, and they were sold by an institution that was a 
valued client. 
 
He ordered the trading partner to return part of the 
profit to the institution.  In addition, he told the trading 
partner that the participation in the profits of the firm 
for him was going to be reduced. 
 
The question then is:  What prompted Bill Salomon to 
take this action in the 1970s?  It was, among other things, 
to protect the relationship with an important 
institutional client.  But it was also to ensure that this 
wouldn’t happen in other transactions of this kind by 
the firm.39 
William Salomon’s dispute with this trading partner was about the 
relative importance of a quantitative value (the size of the profit Salomon 
took on a trade) and a qualitative value (Salomon’s relationship with a 
client).  The client relationship could generate additional profits in the 
future, but those could not be assessed quantitatively in the present. 
Imagine Salomon’s reaction if he had been told that the trader did 
something illegal to cheat a client.  We don’t know how often that 
happened, if at all, when Salomon was head of the firm, but we do know 
                                                 
39 Henry Kaufman & Joanne J. Myers, Henry Kaufman on Civility in the Financial Sector, 
Address at the Carnegie Council (June 20, 2011), available at http://www.carnegiecouncil. 
org/studio/multimedia/20110620/index.html#section-21657.  “Civility” itself is another 
value that is difficult to measure quantitatively. 
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that it happened years after he had left the firm and after it became a 
publicly-held company in 1981.  Probably the most valuable business 
relationship Salomon Brothers had as a major bond dealer was with the 
U.S. Treasury, a relationship that was shattered when a trader illegally 
attempted to corner the market in Treasury securities in 1991.40  Senior 
management, when told what had happened, ignored the violation.41  
When they were caught later, the Treasury Department almost shut the 
entire firm down. 
In 2012, Greg Smith, a senior Goldman Sachs executive, published a 
New York Times op-ed titled, Why I am Leaving Goldman Sachs.42  He 
described Goldman’s proud history of serving clients for over one 
hundred years and then the recent deterioration of its client 
relationships: 
To put the problem in the simplest terms, the interests of 
the client continue to be sidelined in the way the firm 
operates and thinks about making money. . . .  
 
 . . . .  
 
What are three quick ways to become a leader [at 
Goldman Sachs]?  a) Execute on the firm’s “axes,” which 
is Goldman-speak for persuading your clients to invest 
in the stocks or other products that we are trying to get 
rid of because they are not seen as having a lot of 
potential profit.  b) “Hunt Elephants.”  In English:  get 
your clients—some of whom are sophisticated, and 
some of whom aren’t—to trade whatever will bring the 
biggest profit to Goldman.  Call me old-fashioned, but I 
don’t like selling my clients a product that is wrong for 
them.  c) Find yourself sitting in a seat where your job is 
to trade any illiquid, opaque product with a three-letter 
acronym. 
 
                                                 
40 See In re Gutfreund, Exchange Act Release No. 3-7930, 1992 WL 362753, at *11–12 (Dec. 
3, 1992) (finding violations by top officers of Salomon Brothers Inc., who knew of a bond 
trader’s illegal efforts to corner the market in Treasury securities but failed to report it as 
required by law). 
41 Id. at *12. 
42 Greg Smith, Why I Am Leaving Goldman Sachs, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/14/opinion/why-i-am-leaving-goldman-sachs.html? 
pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
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Today, many of these leaders display a Goldman Sachs 
culture quotient of exactly zero percent.  I attend 
derivatives sales meetings where not one single minute 
is spent asking questions about how we can help clients.  
It’s purely about how we can make the most possible 
money off of them.  If you were an alien from Mars and 
sat in on one of these meetings, you would believe that a 
client’s success or progress was not part of the thought 
process at all. 
 
It makes me ill how callously people talk about ripping 
their clients off.  Over the last 12 months I have seen five 
different managing directors refer to their own clients as 
“muppets,” sometimes over internal e-mail. . . .  
 
 . . . .  
 
It astounds me how little senior management gets a 
basic truth:  If clients don’t trust you they will eventually 
stop doing business with you.  It doesn’t matter how 
smart you are.43 
There are many factors underlying this shift in culture in investment 
banks.44  The point I make here is that a large part of the problem is 
emphasis on factors that can be quantified—present earnings and stock 
price—at the expense of factors such as reputation and customer 
relationships, which are not easy to quantify.  In the days when Salomon 
Brothers and Goldman Sachs were “elite” investment banks because of a 
longstanding reputation in the business community, these qualitative 
factors may have been important, but not so in a world where 
quantitative factors are preeminent, and managers of even the best banks 
are repeatedly required to “prove themselves” according to the numbers.  
A lot of priorities are crowded out in such an environment, and, as Smith 
pointed out in his editorial, business ethics is one of them.45 
                                                 
43 Id. 
44 See Claire Hill & Richard Painter, Berle’s Vision Beyond Shareholder Interests:  Why 
Investment Bankers Should Have (Some) Personal Liability, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1173, 1183–84 
(2010) (arguing that the factors that lead to a shift in culture involved investment banks 
shifting from a partnership structure to corporations, which coincided with directors 
shifting their focus to short-term gains and receiving larger bonuses). 
45 Smith, supra note 42. 
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C. Cover-Ups 
Perhaps the worst form of “crowding out” occurs when decision-
makers confront wrongdoing, and, because of their single-minded 
obsession with meeting numerical targets, they don’t do anything about 
the wrongdoing or even cover it up. 
Horace Mann School in New York City has been one of the most 
successful private schools in the country in meeting numerical targets—
its SAT scores and Ivy League admissions statistics are among the best in 
the country.46  The fact that Horace Mann does statistically better than 
many of the boarding schools that dominated Ivy League admissions up 
through the 1950s is an indicator of how James Conant’s vision of 
meritocratic ascendancy in the 1930s finally became a reality.47  Horace 
Mann was led for several decades up through the late 1990s by Inslee 
Clark, the man who had brought a similar approach to Yale’s admissions 
in the 1960s.48 
In 2012, the New York Times published a lengthy essay by a Horace 
Mann alumnus who reported something drastically wrong beneath this 
veneer of extraordinary success.  Several teachers were sexually abusing 
students on multiple occasions:  Inslee Clark and other administrators 
knew about the abuse, and they did nothing about it.49  The 
administrators had priorities and addressing this problem was not one of 
them.  The same thing has of course happened at other schools without 
as accomplished an academic record, so one cannot blame it only on the 
pursuit of high SAT scores.  Nonetheless, it is also true that reporting the 
abuse and telling parents about it would have, temporarily at least, made 
it more difficult for Horace Mann to compete with other New York 
private schools in attracting academically talented students—a critical 
factor in generating numerical statistics that put Horace Mann at the top.  
Now that the abuse has been exposed years later by an alumnus and not 
by the school, the current crop of administrators can claim that it is part 
of the school’s history and has nothing to do with the experiences that 
                                                 
46 See David Chung, Top High Schools Find Admission Success, THE BROWN DAILY HER., 
Apr. 27, 2011, http://www.browndailyherald.com/top-high-schools-find-admissions-
success-1.2553620#.UJU9r45Z_ww (noting that Horace Mann was ranked second in the 
nation by Forbes). 
47 See supra notes 3–7 and accompanying text (discussing the evolution of the SAT and 
the changes in Ivy League school admissions). 
48 See Amos Kamil, Prep School Predators:  The Horace Mann School’s Secret History of Sexual 
Abuse, N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 6, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/10/magazine/ 
the-horace-mann-schools-secret-history-of-sexual-abuse.html (describing R. Inslee Clark as 
a legendary reformer). 
49 See id. (describing stories of sexual assault at Horace Mann by a variety of different 
teachers and the failure of the administration to address these concerns). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 47, No. 2 [2013], Art. 23
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol47/iss2/23
2013] Numerical Half-Truths 495 
students have there today.  After dealing with the bad publicity and 
unpleasant alumni relations from the scandal, they can get back to the 
pursuit of academic excellence according to the metrics they and many 
other educators believe to be most important. 
Penn State University has been extraordinarily successful for several 
decades in meeting a different type of numerical target:  football wins 
and bowl championships.50  In a country obsessed with sports as much 
as academic achievement, these numbers mean a lot.  Penn State’s 
football metrics also translated into something that all colleges and 
universities care about:  money.  Proud alumni gave enormous amounts 
of money to Penn State in honor of its football program and Joe Paterno, 
its coach for several decades. 
In late 2011, the world learned the shocking news about what had 
been going on for decades underneath this veneer of success.  Paterno’s 
assistant coach, Gerald Sandusky, had used the lure of privileged access 
to Penn State football to attract young boys and then molested and raped 
the boys in the locker rooms and elsewhere on the Penn State campus, as 
well as at his own home.51  Paterno knew about this and told his 
superiors at Penn State.52  His superiors, including the athletic director 
and the president of the university, did nothing about it.53  They did not 
inform the police or even ban Sandusky from the Penn State campus; 
Paterno also failed to take any additional action.54  Penn State covered-
up the abuse, while Sandusky continued to molest and rape young boys 
with impunity.55 
I and other authors have written about the litany of corporate cover 
ups—Enron and many others—that have dominated our business 
landscape for decades.  Wal-Mart’s apparent bribery cover-up in Mexico 
is a more recent episode of the same phenomenon.56  Generally, once 
people know there is a problem, they do not act to correct it but instead 
                                                 
50 See generally Penn State Football History Database, NATIONALCHAMPS.NET, 
http://www.nationalchamps.net/NCAA/database/pennstate_database.htm (last visited 
Nov. 3, 2012). 
51 See Freeh Sporkin & Sullivan, LLP, Report of the Special Investigative Counsel Regarding 
the Actions of the Pennsylvania State University Related to the Child Sexual Abuse Committed by 
Gerald A. Sandusky 19–30 (2012), http://www.thefreehreportonpsu.com/REPORT_FINAL_ 
071212.pdf (providing a timeline of the assaults and the locations of the assaults, beginning 
in 1998). 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 See generally id. (giving an extensive overview of the sexual allegations against Jerry 
Sandusky and the purported cover-up by University of Penn State officials). 
56 See supra note 28 and accompanying text (discussing the allegations of corruption 
against Wal-Mart). 
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cover it up, postponing but not avoiding the pain.  One common 
denominator is that many of these decision-makers are obsessed with 
meeting numerical targets, namely stock price and reported earnings.  
Dealing with a crisis earlier rather than later may mean a temporary hit 
to numerical performance. 
In these public companies—as at Horace Mann and Penn State—
obsession with numerical targets intensifies what I have elsewhere called 
the “psychology of the cover-up.”  A cognitive bias underlying the 
cover-up phenomenon is the tendency to take risks, including ethical 
risks, in a “loss frame,” where the decision-maker has to choose among 
two types of potential losses.  The decision is between accepting a loss 
(for example, acknowledging a missed earnings target, having to fire a 
football coach who has had a string of victories, or firing high school 
teachers who have mentored some students toward the Ivy League while 
molesting others) and the alternative of trying to avoid the loss by 
risking a potentially much greater loss (being caught committing 
securities fraud or a scandal over child sex abuse in an educational 
institution). 
Decision-makers in such a loss frame often choose the riskier course 
of action, even if it is not logical because it is unlikely to work in the long 
run.  Cognitive pyschologists have studied this phenomenon and have 
described this framing effect as part of what they call “prospect 
theory.”57  Even casinos know about this theory and profit when 
gamblers in a loss frame dig themselves deeper into a hole, thinking they 
can climb out of it—this psychological bias, like many others, is probably 
exacerbated by alcohol, perhaps explaining the availability of free drinks 
in many gambling establishments.  In a July 2012 op-ed, former White 
House counsel John Dean acknowledged that this “psychology of the 
cover-up” in a loss frame explained much of his own conduct in 
Watergate, as well as the cover-up that had occurred more recently at 
Penn State.58 
Numerical targets—earning projections, stock prices, test scores, 
college admissions statistics, and football scores—provide the frame of 
                                                 
57 See generally Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 2 (analyzing how an individual’s ability 
to make decisions is affected by both the risk of losing and the potential overall gain). 
58 John Dean, How Lawyers Can Minimize Professional Mistakes During a Scandal Like that at 
Penn State:  Part Two in a Two-Part Series of Columns, VERDICT (Aug. 10, 2012), 
http://verdict.justia.com/2012/08/10/how-lawyers-can-minimize-professional-mistakes-
during-a-scandal-like-that-at-penn-state (referencing a prior discussion in RICHARD W. 
PAINTER, GETTING THE GOVERNMENT AMERICA DESERVES:  HOW ETHICS REFORM CAN 
MAKE A DIFFERENCE 282–85 (2011)).  See generally Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 2 
(studying the choices individuals make after assessing the associated risk); Painter, supra 
note 2, at 1413–14 (discussing the psychology behind a cover-up). 
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reference that can easily put decision-makers in a loss frame.  These 
targets often escalate over time, and, as the targets get more ambitious, 
there is greater risk that something will get in the way of meeting them.  
Covering-up the obstacle to success is sometimes the preferred choice, 
even if it is not the ethically responsible choice. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
College students, law students, academic administrators, coaches, 
lawyers, and corporate executives all live in a world that values a form of 
“merit” measured by numbers.  Sometimes, the numbers tell the truth 
about selected dimensions of achievement:  Penn State probably did 
score all of the touchdowns they are reported to have scored over the 
past two decades; SAT scores accurately reflect the number of correct 
and incorrect answers to specified questions, unless students cheat; law 
schools have the mean LSAT and GPA they report, unless they lie; 
corporations’ reported earnings correlate with their actual earnings, 
according to generally accepted accounting principles (“GAAP”), unless 
the financials do not comply with GAAP.  Sometimes people lie about 
the numbers.  At other times, the numbers themselves do not tell the 
entire truth; for example, when stock price and earnings do not reflect 
the true value of a company.  People who know this sometimes use the 
numbers to tell half-truths. 
Numbers sometimes tell part of a story but tell nothing about 
something else that is drastically wrong with a school, a college sports 
program, or a company.  Decision-makers obsessed with the pursuit of a 
one or two-dimensional numerical metric do not want to be bothered 
with dealing with a different problem, which may in fact be much more 
important than whatever the numbers are supposed to represent. 
In this Paper, I have not suggested particular solutions to this 
dilemma.  I have suggested that living a personal and professional life 
according to a metric that cannot easily be measured may ultimately be 
more satisfying than continuously striving to meet numerical goals.  
Finding that metric is up to each individual and institution.  I am 
honored to have given this lecture in honor of a man who has found a 
meaningful metric to guide his life, and I wish the same for the students, 
faculty, and staff of this law school, as well as other members of our 
profession. 
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